A tax-based incomes policy (TIP): what's it all about? by Nancy Jianakoplos
SUBJECT corporations to higher corporate in-
come tax rates if they give pay raises which are too
large. This is the essence of a plan devised by Gov-
ernor Henry C. Wallich of the Federal Reserve Board
and Sidney Weintraub of tile University of Pennsyl-
vania.1 Their proposal to use the tax system to curb
inflation is called “TIP,” an acronym for tax-based in-
comes policy. As inflation continues to plague the
economy, many economists feel that the traditional
tools of monetary and fiscal policy are inadequate to
handle the situation and have recommended direct
measures to stop wage and price increases.2 The Wal-
lich-Weintraub plan has received considerable atten-
tion as a policy measure which might be capable of
dealing with the problem of inflation.3
Before adopting a program such as TIP, it is im-
portant to understand clearly how the proposal would
operate and, more importantly, whether it would
achieve the desired results. The first part of this
article describes the functioning of TIP and the
rationale for such a program as envisioned by Wallich
1W~lieh and Weintraub first collaborated on this idea in
Henry C. Wallich and Sidney Weintraub, “A Tax-Based In-
comes Policy,” Journal of Economic ‘noes (June 1971), pp.
1-19.
and Weifitraub. The rest of the article is devoted to
an assessment of whether TIP would accomplish its
stated objectives.
HOW WOULD TIP OPERATE?
According to the plan presented by Wallich and
Weintraub, TIP would he centered on a single wage
guidepost established by the Government.4 The ac-
ceptable percentage wage increase could he set some-
where between the average increase in productivity
throughout the economy (asserted to he around 3 per-
cent) and some larger figure which incorporates all or
part of the current rate of inflation. The ultimate aim
of the guidepost is to bring wage increases in line
with nationwide productivity increases.
The TIP guidepost is directed at wages only, al-
though the tax is levied on corporate profits. The
basic assumption behind TIP is that monetary and
fiscal policies have been ineffective because they have
not been able to prevent labor from obtaining wage
increases in excess of productivity gains, even when
there is significant unemployment in the economy.
Furthermore, Wallich and Weintraub contend that
empirical evidence supports the view that price in-
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creases have been a constant mam’knp over unit wage
increases. Therefore, if wage increases can he kept
down, price increases will also he held down.
The corporate income tax system would be em-
ployed to enforce the TIP guidepost. Corporations
which grant wage increases in excess of the gtnclepost
would be suhject to higher corporate income tax rates
based on the amount that wage increases exceed
the guidepost.
In order to understand how TIP would operate,
consider the following example. Suppose the guide-
post for wage increases is set at, say, 5 percent for a
particular year. In the base year, Corporation A had
a total wage hill of $100,000 and in the following year
granted increases which brought its total wage bill to
$108,000 — an 8 percent increase. Assuming no change
in either the number or composition of the employees.
this 8 percent increase is 3 percentage points above
the guidepost. This excess would then he multiplied
by a penalty number. If, for instance, the penalty was
set at 2, the corporate tax rate of Corporation A
would he increased by 6 percentage points ( 3 per-
centage point excess times penalty nuroher of 2).
Thus, instead of paying 48 percent of its profits in
taxes, the existing corporate tax rate, Corporation A
would have to pay 54 percent of its profits, as a pen-
alty for acceding to “excessive” wage demands.
Wallich arid \Veintrauh argue that because of com-
petitive forces this additional tax could not he shifted
forward to prices.5 They, therefore, believe that such
a tax penalty would cause corporations to deal more
firmly with labor. In their view the penalty would
ultimately restrain the rate of wage increases and,
hence, reduce the rate of inflation.6 Since wage in-
creases would he curbed, corporations would not
have higher costs to pass through in the form of price
increases, thereby eliminating a major “cost-push” ele-
ment of inflation. Furthermore, since the increases in
incomes of workers would more closely approximate
increases in productivity, there would he smaller in-
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creases in spending, reducing the “demand-pull” as-
pect of inflation.
W7allich and \Veintraub acknowledge certain diffi-
culties in computing the corporation’s wage hill. One
method which they believe would overcome many of
these difficulties would he to construct an index of
wages, rather than using the gross dollar figure. Using
this method. wages, fringe benefits, and other related
payments would he computed for each job classifica-
tion and skill level and divided hy the hours worked
at each level. These wage figures would then he com-
bined into am] index weighted by the proportion of
each of these classifications in the entire corporation.
Changes in this index would then he compared to the
guidepost in order to assess whether the corporation
would he penalized.
Administrative problems are not neglected by \Val-
lid] and \Veintrauh. They’ recognize that the tax laws
must he specific and “airtight” in order to avoid loop-
holes. However, it is argued that TIP would not in-
volve establishing a ne\v bureaucracy. Most of the
data necessary to administer TIP are already’ collected
for corporate income tax~-and emnployee payroll tax
purposes.
One of the principal merits of TIP, in the view of
Wallich and \Veintrauh. is that it would not interfere
with the functioning of the market system. They argue
that there would he no direct controls or distortions
to tile pricing mechanism. Firms would still he free to
grant large \vage demands, hut would face the pen-
alty of a higher corporate tax rate.
Rather than a short-tenn plan to curb inflation, TIP
is envisioned to be a long-term means of reducing
the rate of price increase. however, TIP is not in-
tended to function by itself. Both Wallich and Wein-
traul) see it as a supplemnent to “appropriate mone-
tary and fiscal policies. In addition, if labor contends
that TIP would hold down wages while allowing
profits to increase, Wallich pmoposes the nnplementa—
tion of an excess profits tax. This could he accom-
plished by increasing the basic com’poratc tax rate to
keep the share of profits in national inconle constant.
5
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WOULD TIP WORK?
i’hc TIP proposal has two principal ohjeetives:
(1) to curb inflation, and
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(2) to avoid interfering with the functioning of the
market.
Given these aims of TIP, one can analyze whether
TIP will, in fact, he able to accomplish its goals. Other
issues raised by TIP, such as the costs of implementa-
tion and the ability of firms to avoid the tax penalty
of TIP, will not be discussed here.~
Would TIP Curb inflation?
TIP is based on the assumption that most of the
inflation in the economy is of a “cost-push” nature.
Inflatiomi occurs, according to this framework, because
labor is able to attain wage increases in excess of
increases in productivity. Business is not capable of
resisting, or finds it does not pay to resist, labor’s
demands. Faced with higher costs, businesses pass
these costs through in the form of higher product
prices. As prices rise, further wage increases are
granted, forming the basis of a wage-price spiral.
TIP is proposed as a measure which will intervene
in this process and bring inflation to a halt.
As the Congressional Budget Office stated in a re-
cent study, the assumption that inflation is the result
of “cost-push” is “a conjectural notion at best.”° A
major challenge to the concept of “cost-push” rests
on empirical evidence supporting an alternative the-
ory of the cause of inflation. According to this other
view, ongoing increases in the general price level
(inflation) are primarily the result of excessive in-
creases in the rate of monetary expansion.’° Lags
exist between the time when the money stock is in-
creased and when prices rise. In this framework, the
observed relationship between the rate of wage in-
crease and the rate of price increase is explained as
part of the adjustment process through which prices
increase in response to increases in the money stock.
This view does not deny the “cost-push” phenomenon,
5
F’or a discimssion of implementation problems, see Gardner
Ackley, “Okumm’s New Tax-Based Ineomnes-Policy Proposal,”
Survey Research Center, Instittmte for Social Research, l’he
University of Miehigam, Economic Outlook USA (Winter
1978), pp. 8-9. Although Ackley deals with the anti-inflation
proposal put forxvard Lv Arthur Okun, he notes that the
critique also appbes to the Wallich—Weintrammh proposal.
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— 1971-76,” this Review (June 1976), pp. 17-23.
but contends that it is consistent \vith the view that
inflation is ultimately caused by money growth.11
When the stock of money’ is increased faster than
the rate of increase in production, people find them-
selves with larger cash balances than they desire to
hold. In order to hring their cash balances down to
desired levels, they will spend the money, thereby
bidding up prices on goods and services, and the
general price level will rise. As long as the stock of
money increases faster than the demand for money,
inflation will persist, evem] if TIP mam]ages to hold
down wages temporarily.
Conversely, just as inflation is caused by excessive
growth of the money stock, the only way to stop
inflation is to reduce the grosvtl] of the money stock.
As the rate of monetary expansion is reduced, people
will have cash balances below their desired levels.
They will reduce their rate of spending in order to
build nip these balances. As spending (demand) falls,
the rate of inflation will decrease. Prices are “sticky,”
and just as it took several years to huild up the cur-
rent rate of inflation, it will take several years for
inflation to wind down. One of the by-products of
reducing inflation is a temporary idling of resources,
since prices do not tend to he flexible in the short
run. This is a cost of reducing inflatiom] which mnmst
be borne, just as there are costs imposed on society
as inflation mounts.
The idea that there are certain “key” wages in
society, such as union wages, to which other wages
and prices adjust, confuses the motivation for increas-
ing the money stock with the cause of inflation.’2 If
certain unions are able to attain large wage increases,
even in the face of falling demand, the prices of the
products produced by this labor will increase. As
prices increase, less of this product will be demanded
and the use of the resources (labor and capital) which
produce this product will he decreased. Unemnploy-
ment \vill rise as resources are freed to work in the
production of other products whose prices are lower.
The relative prices of products will change, but the
average price level will he unchanged.
‘‘See Leonall C. Andersen and Denim S. Karnosky, “A Mone-
tary Interpretation of Inflation” in Joel Popkin, ed.,Armalysis
of Inflation: 1965-1974, Studies in Ineon]e and Wealth, Vol.
42, National Bmmreamm of Ecnnomie Research, Inc. (Can]—
bridge, Massachusetts: Ballinger Publishimsg Company, 1977),
pp. 11-26.
lCThis argument draws ou Armen A. Alehian and Williamu R.
Allen, University Economics: Elements of Inquiry ( Belmont,
California: Wadsworth Puhlisl]ing Company, Inc., 1972),
pp. 684-85.
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However, if the Federal Reserve policymakers keep
a close watch on these “key” industries and see an in-
crease in idle resources (unemployment) in these
industries, they may take actions to alleviate the un-
employment by increasing the money stock. The in-
creases in spending resulting from monetary expan-
sion will bid up average prices and return relative
prices to a position similar to that prior to the grant-
ing of the svage demands. It was as a consequence of
the excessive wage demands that policy actions were
motivated, bait it was monetary expansion which
caused the subsequent inflation.
Some proponents of TIP base their support on the
belief that TIP will reduce expectations of inflation.
Lower expectations of inflation in the future, accord-
ing to this view, will lead to lower demands for wage
increases and eventually lower prices. However, ex-
pectations of inflation do not cause inflation.” It is
ongoing inflationary forces in the economy, excessive
rates of monetary expansion, which lead to expecta-
tions of future inflation. Curbing inflationary expecta-
tions requires curbing the undemlying forces which
cause them.
Wallieh and Weintrauh agree that TIP is a supple-
ment to, not a substitute for, “appropriate” monetary
and fiscal policy. However, the character of their
“appropriate” monetary policy is questionable. In the
basic article which outlined TIP, Wallich arid Wein-
fi-aub stated, “. ..the proposal is conceived as a sup-
plement to the familiar monetary-fiscal policies so that
the economy might operate closer to full employmem]t
without the inflationary danger of excess demand and
‘overheating.’ “14 Indeed, in a later article \Veintraub
is more specific: “Given a suitable incomes policy to
align wages (and salaries) to productivity, monetary
policy would be released to make its contrihution to
full employment. --Full employment requires ample
money supplies for its sustenance.”5 Thams, it appears
that “appropriate” monetary policy, in the view of
\Vallich and \Veintraub, is expansionary; however, a
restrictive monetary policy is necessary to curb
inflation.
This disparity in determining the appropriate char-
acter of monetary pohcy points out another prohlem
with TIP. Given the lag time involved in the func-
mmWeintranmb supports this contention in Weintraimb, “Incon]es
Policy: Completing the Stabilization Tm-iangle,” p. 1.16.
‘
4
Wallich and Weintraub, “A Tax-Based Incon]em Policy,” p. 1.
msWeintraub, “Incomnes Policy: Completing the Stabilization
Triangle,” p. 110.
tioning of monetary policy, it might appear in the
short run that TIP is, at least temporarily, holding
down prices. If, at the same time, the Federal Reserve
increases the rate of monetary expansion, inflationary
pressures will actually be augmented. An incomes
policy, such as TIP. gives polieymakers the illusion of
taking corrective measures against inflatiom] when, in
fact, reducimmg the rate of monetary expansion is the
om]ly way to accomplish that goal. In summary, it
appears that TIP would m]ot he effective in reducing
n]flation and could make matters worse hy fostering
ii]appropriate mom]etary policy.
Would TIP interfere With the Market?
Wallich and Weintraub argue that TIP would not
interfere witl] market pricing because no ceilings are
placed on any \vages or prices. TIP operates through
the tax system, yet it is based on a single guidepost
for every firm arid industry. They contend that a
single guidepost is appropriate because in competi-
tion all comparahle workers would earn the same
wage. TIP, therefore, is only imposing what eomnpeti-
tion would achieve.
The problem with this argument is tl]at it is only
true if all industries are in equilibrium arid remain
there. In a growing, changing ecom]omy, edluilib-
riumn prices and wage rates-are changing. Prices and
wages are constantly moving toward new equilibria;
l]enee, there is no reason to believe that each sector
in the economy would he at equilibrium when TIP
was imposed or would remain there afterward. In the
U. S. economy, demands and tastes of com]sumers are
constantly shifting and the technology and products
offered by business are also el]am]ging. As a conse-
quence, the equilibrium prices of some goods are ris-
ing (houses, for exan]ple) wl]ile others are faIl-
ing (electrom]ic calculators). In adldition, some firms
are growing, making large profits, and seeking addi-
tional labor, while others are declining, earning very
little profit, and contracting their labor forces.
Imposing a single wage guidepost would distort the
price system. It does not matterwhether the guidepost
is imposed through the tax system or by direct fines
and penalties. Those firms which are grosving or are
adapting to changim]g consumer tastes have an incen-
tive to hire scarce resources (capital and labor) away
from other firms, hut they would he penalized either
through a lower rate of return, if they grant “excess”
wage demands, or by a harrier to growth if they
adhere to the guidepost. Consequently, in son]e in-
stances labor would not be compensated in accord
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with the demand for its services. In other cases, firms
would not be able to attract all the labor they de-
sired. Relative prices would, therefore, he distorted
by the establishment of a single gamidepost for all
firms and industries.
The TIP proposal would lead to a misallocation of
resources. Prices,when allowed to operate freely, offer
signals of where demand is increasing and where de-
mand is falling. Resources move to those indimstries
or firms where they will receive the highest compen-
sation. The TIP proposal woamld obscure these price
signals and, hence, resoamrces would not move to
where they would be used mnost efficiently. The econ-
omy would suffer since production would be lower
than it would be otherwise.
The distortions in the economy caused by TIP
could have a very long lasting effect. Capital (plant
and equipment) is allocated by the market to those
firms which have the highest rate of return. The TIP
proposal would reduce the rates of return of those
firms which are growing, and capital would not he
adequately allocated to them. Capital generally tends
to have a relatively long life. Once it is misalloeated,
as a result of TIP, it would not he easy to reallocate
it to a more efficient use. Thus, TIP could have serious
long-term consequences, as a result of the distortions
it would cause in the price system.
CONCLUSION
TIP is an incomes policy designed to reduce infla-
tion without interfering with the n]arket system. The
essence of the proposal is to stmbject corporations to
higher corporate im]come tax rates if they granted pay
increases in excess of a single Goverm]mem]t-mandated
guidepost.
lIP would not be successful in reducing the rate of
inflation because it is based on the premise tl]at infla-
tion is largely a “cost-push” phenon]enon — higher
wages leading to higher prices, which lead to still
higher \vages. IT]flation, however, is caused primarily
by excessive growth of the money stock. The TIP
proposal, therefore, deals only with the symptoms of
inflation, rather than attacking inflation at its root.
TIP would distort the market pricing system be-
cause the imposition of a single wage guidepost
would not allow relative prices to adjmmst fully to
change. This would lead to inefficiencies am]d a lower
level of production than would be otherwise
attainable.
Inflation is a serious problem, and there are no magic
solutions. There may he a temporary reduction in the
apparent rate of inflation with TIP, but eventamally
leaks will develop in the system and prices will rise
anyway. The only xvay to stop inflation is to reduce
the rate of monetary expansion.
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